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We investigate the impact of the imposition of sanctions for employing illegal migrants on the 
welfare of native workers. Our analysis is based on the premise that in response to such 
sanctions, managers in a firm may be reassigned from supervision of production to 
verification of the legality of the firm’s workforce. When there is full employment in the host 
country, a profit-maximizing firm will assign managers to verification if the sanctions are 
steep enough. This reassignment impedes production efficiency and, consequently, leads to a 
reduction in the wages of both illegal migrants and native workers, inevitably hurting the 
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In the U.S., employer sanctions were introduced in 1986 as part of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA), prohibiting employers to hire illegal aliens. Two decades 
later (in 2007), the U.S. government mandated all federal agencies to use E-verify, an 
internet-based system that compares information from an employee’s Form I-9 with 
governmental data in order to check employment eligibility.
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 In 2009, the mandate to use E-
verify was extended to all federal contractors. By 2011, individual States such as Arizona, 
Utah, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina enacted E-verify mandates for all 
employers. In June 2011, a bill to mandate all employers in the U.S. to use E-verify was 
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The new immigration laws create stricter 
requirements for businesses hiring workers and harsher punishments for anyone who employs 
an illegal immigrant. It is noteworthy that the U.S. government has been switching to an 
enforcement policy based less on raids targeting workers, and more on I-9 audits of 
employers, which is very costly to the firm. It is also worth noting that more than 5 percent of 
the U.S. workforce is unauthorized, and in some industries (agriculture, leisure and 
hospitality, and other services) this share is much larger. Needless to add, the new regulations 
are especially costly in industries with short-term contracts, with high turnover, and with 
seasonal employment of short duration. On the other side of Atlantic, the European Union 
legislature too is considering employer sanctions. In a Directive from June 2009, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union admit that “a key pull factor for 
illegal immigration into the EU is the possibility of obtaining work in the EU without the 
required legal status. Action against illegal immigration and illegal stay should therefore 
include measures to counter that pull factor.” A proclaimed remedy to the said factor is 
“general prohibition on the employment of third-country nationals who do not have the right 
to be resident in the EU, accompanied by sanctions against employers who infringe that 
prohibition” (Directive 2009/52/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June, 
2009). 
Studies of the impact of employer sanctions on the welfare of native workers do not 
yield an unequivocal verdict. For example, in the general equilibrium model of Hill and 
Pearce (1990), employer sanctions can make employers more reluctant to employ workers at 
                                                           
1
 Every employer in the U.S. has to fill in Form I-9 for every employee. The Form consists of information and 
supporting documents provided by the employee. Although employers are required to collect information, filling 
in the I-9 Form is distinct from verifying the validity of the information. E-verify provides employers with a tool 
that helps them refrain from hiring illegal workers. 
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all; the fear of employing illegal migrants can decrease the wages and/or employment of 
natives or of legal migrants when the risk that an illegal will “slip through” the recruitment 
procedure is taken into account. Katz and Stark (1985) derived the same result albeit in a 
partial equilibrium setting. Empirical work by Cobb-Clark et al. (1995) reveals that the wages 
of low-skilled natives fell after the U.S. government introduced sanctions for employing non-
legal migrants in 1986, when IRCA was enacted. Fry et al. (1995) divide the sanctions 
imposed by IRCA between “paperwork fines” (fines for not complying with the requirements 
to document the legality of each employed worker) and “hiring fines” (fines for knowingly 
employing illegals). They find that “paperwork fines” lower average metropolitan wages 
because the bureaucratic burden constitutes an added cost of hiring. Additionally, imposition 
of the sanctions was reported to result in wage- and employment-discrimination of legal 
workers from ethnic groups perceived by employers to be “at risk” of being “contaminated” 
by illegal migrants (see, for example, Lowell et al., 1995; Bansak, 2005).  
In ongoing research we inquire whether employer sanctions can be detrimental to the 
welfare of the native workers who are the intended beneficiaries of the policy. We address 
this problem by analyzing the response of employers to the introduction of such sanctions. 
Here, we report our first results, obtained when conducting the analysis in conditions of full 
employment. We find that firms consider it optimal to apply measures aimed at verifying the 
legal status of their workers if the sanction for employing illegal migrants is steep enough. We 
show that the cost of applying the measures (in terms of falling production efficiency) lowers 
the returns to labor and, consequently, also the wage paid to workers (natives and illegal 
migrants alike). In the next section, we conduct an exploratory analysis for the full 
employment configuration in the host country labor market, and we unearth the mechanism 
through which employer sanctions trigger a “defensive” response by firms such that the 
welfare of the native workers suffers. In section 3 we conclude. 
2. A benchmark case - full employment in the host economy  
Consider a “host” country, H, with a workforce that consists of native workers 
(including possibly legal migrants), and illegal migrants. Each worker is endowed with one 
unit of efficiency labor (skill-wise, the workforce is homogeneous). There are n identical 
firms, using each a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production technology to produce 
a single consumption good, the price of which is normalized at one. The firms employ two 
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production inputs: labor, and management.
2
 Management input is measured in units of time 
devoted to supervising the production process. There is an upper limit to this time which, to 
begin with, is met. Thus, if another task requires management’s attention, that will have to 
come at the expense of supervision time. The output of a single firm employing 
i
L , 1,...,i n= , 
workers (efficiency units of labor) and 
i
M  units of management time to supervise production 
is  
 ( ) 1,i i i i iY L M L M
α α−= ,  
where (0,1)α ∈  is the output elasticity of labor.  
From the properties of the constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, 
the aggregate demand of production inputs and the output of n firms in a competitive 
economy are the same as those of a single firm employing all the workers, using the entire 
available management input, and yielding the entire output. Therefore, the behavior of 
producers in H can be analyzed using this “representative” firm, and production can be 
described as 













=∑ . We assume that without (costly) verification of the legal 
status of workers, a firm has no way of recognizing whether a worker it employs is legal or 
illegal.  
Let the government of H  impose sanctions on the employment of illegal workers. The 
rationale of applying these measures is to protect the native workers from being hurt by the 
inflow of illegal workers, either in terms of a decrease in their wages as a result of the 
increased supply of labor, or in terms of an increase in unemployment. Let a parameter 0T >  




In the setting studied in this paper we assume that the entire labor force, 
N M
L L L= +  
where 
N
L  and 
M
L  are, respectively, the numbers of native workers and illegal migrants, is 
                                                           
2
 As the inflow of illegal workers is unlikely to change the stock of capital in country H, we omit it from the 
production function, treating it as a constant normalized to one.  
3
 To be closer to the real-world implementation of an immigration policy based on employer sanctions, we can 
interpret T as the penalty times the (perceived by employer) probability of being inspected by the immigration 





 Then, if the firm does not apply any measure to verify the legal status of the 
workers that it hires, the fines paid for all the employed illegal workers will amount to 
M
L T . 
An optimizing firm will, however, try to avoid being burdened by this penalty. We assume 
that the firm can reallocate some of its management input from supervising production to 
verification of workers’ legal status. The fraction of management time devoted to this task is 
measured by the parameter [0,1]v ∈ . To concentrate on essentials, we assume that the number 
of illegal migrants employed by the firm then falls to (1 )
M
v L− , namely, that there is a one-to-
one relationship between the fraction of management time assigned to verification of the 
workers’ legal status and the efficiency of this verification. This implies that 
M
vL  of the 
firm’s illegal employees are “filtered” out. Correspondingly, verification results in fines of 
only (1 )
M
v L T− . 
We analyze the optimal behavior of the firm. The firm has to decide how to divide its 
management time optimally between the two tasks. The firm’s output when (1 )v M−  
management time is devoted to supervising production is  
 [ ] [ ] [ ]
1
( ), , ( ) (1 )Y L v M v L v v M
α α−
= − ,  
where ( ) (1 )
N M
L v L v L= + −  is the input of labor after the “filtering” out of 
M
vL  illegal 
migrants. The function of the profits of the firm is  
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− − − −
= − − − − −
=
 (1) 
where ( )w v  is the wage paid to a worker, and m is the wage payment to a unit of management 
time. To further concentrate on essentials, we assume that the wage payment to a unit of 
management is given exogenously (for example, as a result of collective bargaining), whereas 
the wage payment to a worker is determined according to the marginal product of labor.
5,6 
This usage is 
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 We assume that the number of illegal workers or an approximate estimate of that number is public knowledge. 
5
 Even when the firm undertakes verification measures, it cannot wage-discriminate between native and migrant 
workers; the (1 )
M
v L−  illegal migrants who “slip through” the verification cordon are indistinguishable from the 
natives. 
6
 The firm could perceive the penalty for employing illegals as an additional cost of labor: it could lower wages 
so as to factor the expected penalty into the cost of labor. Due to the complexity of the calculations that follow, 
in the evaluation of the marginal product of labor we disregard this effect. However, because this effect leads to 
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From (3) we have that 
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We denote the (negative of the) second term in (4) as 
 [ ]
1
( ) (1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) .) (1 )
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 = − + − + − − −      
We can interpret ( )F v  as the marginal loss in productivity experienced by the firm as a result 
of shifting v fraction of management time from supervising production to verification 
activities. The amount 
M
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=  has no solution, namely, the marginal gain 
from avoiding the penalty is lower than the marginal loss in productivity from reallocating the 









such a case, the sanction is neutral for the firm’s behavior, that is, the firm finds it optimal to 










=  has exactly one solution (c.f. (5) and (6)). 
We denote this solution by ( )v T . We note that ( )v T  is a function such that 


















=  (c.f. (5), (6), and the continuity of ( )F v  for 
[0,1)v ∈ ). In this case then, the firm finds it optimal to reassign some of its management from 
supervising production to verification activities, which bears negatively on the firm’s 
production efficiency. 
In sum, the optimal fraction of management time devoted to verification as a function of 
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The aggregate welfare of the native workers can be measured by their wage earnings, 
 * *( ) ( )
N
W v T L w v T   =    . (9) 
From (2) we know (writing for brevity ( )w v  as w ) that  
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We therefore conclude that in conditions of full employment, employer sanctions in the 
form of a penalty to the firm for engaging illegal workers are either neutral to the welfare of 
the native workers (when the penalty is too low to trigger a reaction by the firm), or they 
decrease the welfare of the native workers (as when the firm finds it optimal to sacrifice some 
production efficiency in order to reduce the fines that it would be required to pay). 
Interestingly, although the verification of the workers’ legal status reduces the supply of labor 
(from 
N M
L L+  to *1 ( )
N M
L v T L + −  ), and, in general, a reduction in the supply of labor 
could have been expected to have a positive effect on wages, the loss in production efficiency 
due to the reallocation of management time is too high to allow the positive labor supply 
effect to dominate.  
3. Conclusions 
We presented a model of the response of an optimizing firm to the introduction of 
employer sanctions of varying degrees of severity under full employment in the host country. 
We found that when the sanction is set at a high enough level, a defense mechanism is 
triggered, causing the firm to sacrifice production efficiency and shift managers’ time from 
supervising production to verifying the legality of employees. This response leads to a 
reduction in the returns to labor (wages), and the sanctions fail to benefit the native workers in 
this setting. We thus identified a state of the host country’s economy in which employer 
sanctions have consequence that fly in the face of the very aim of their introduction. The next 
steps in the analysis will be to investigate the effects of sanctions in other possible labor 
market conditions in the host economy such as voluntary unemployment, and involuntary 
unemployment in conjunction with minimal wage setting, and to do so under alternative 
8 
 
assumptions with regard to the efficiency of the verification technology. We are taking these 
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